

A NEW JEWISH THEOLOGY IN THE MAKING

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AUTONOMY VERSUS TRADITION

THE REFORM of Judaism to meet the situation of an emancipated Jewry became possible only when, even unconsciously, the autonomy of man could be asserted and given precedence over against the authority of Jewish tradition. Because Moses Mendelssohn could do so only in the realm of theology and not in that of practice he remains "orthodox." When Israel Jacobson believed the individual's duty to follow his mind and conscience was more important than following inherited forms of liturgical observances, then the reform could begin. But because Jacobson and other innovators consciously directed their autonomous will to the continuation of historic Judaism, they considered their modification of it itself Judaism. Indeed, if change was once central to Judaism, liberalism is now the most authentic form of Judaism.

Theoretically, the autonomy is prior to the tradition and has hierarchical superiority in matters of decision. Practically, the German liberals were men who used it to renew their Judaism. So they are Liberal, Progressive, or Reform Jews, with the autonomous adjectives modifying the tradition, which remains the continuing substantive term. When Moses Mendelssohn's children and grandchildren could not autonomously affirm Judaism, they followed their enlightened will into the church. Today they would become some variety of secular man. Only

now they are so often joined by other refugees from Judaism that they form a Jewish class and it is difficult therefore to tell on which side of the margin of continuing Jewishness they still stand.

This paradox of a logically prior autonomy used to affirm the value of Jewish tradition has, in fact, been basic to all non-orthodox Jewish theology since the early nineteenth century and the source of its inevitable intellectual tensions. Already in Zechariah Frankel and Samuel Holdheim of that time, progressive Judaism had to face the demand for a reactionary or a revolutionary turn. Voices at either extreme are again heard today. By their very opposition to one another they drive the divergent positions yet farther apart and tend to polarize all liberal Jewish thinking. It should be helpful therefore as well as intellectually interesting to explore the problematic of affirming in the present situation the simultaneous value of the autonomous will and Judaism's demands on the Jew.

Liberal Jews should not underestimate their great stake in the concept of autonomy, for it is the source of their special contribution to Judaism. They came into being because they were not content simply to accept what the Jewish past brought to a radically transformed Jewish present. Rather, their forefathers of the nineteenth century had the courage to insist against what their Jewish teachers had taught them, that Judaism's creative adaptiveness through the ages is one of its chief characteristics, and against what the authorities of their community insisted, that it can change. When they did so they defended themselves ultimately on the basis of what Kant had already defined as the key principle of enlightenment: the autonomy of man. The early liberals did not apply the concept as individualistically as did the philosophers of their day or this. The German rabbis wrote and thought more of the autonomy of each generation or epoch, thus validating in a rather corporate way their right to differ from their ghetto

forebears. Thus they preserved a community aspect to their sense of rightful change and hoped to avoid the anarchy or defection that would be the fruit of radical individualism. In their reform of Judaism they hoped to fuse the best of the tradition with modern man's sense of truth and value. They tried to shape a Judaism that they felt would stand the scrutiny and fulfill the standards of autonomous man. So they selected and adapted as well as transmitted the Jewish heritage. They stressed prayer in the vernacular, sermons that spoke to mind and heart, instruction for girls as well as boys. They wanted understanding to bring commitment, insight to transform faith by continuity into one of willed acceptance.

It was a grand and noble enterprise. Not so long ago, in the multiple forms of modernized Judaism it had engendered, it seemed to have succeeded nicely. A contemporary style of Judaism has come to seem the most natural thing in the world. Not only do most Jews no longer live in the ghetto manner and yet consider themselves to be loyal Jews, but even the traditionally observant have changed the tone and emphasis of their practice in a way that seemed unthinkable in the early, acrimonious debates.

Alas, that happy balance between modernity and tradition is breaking down. On the one side it is because modern man, under the influence of a secular civilization, has become more radical in his demands for autonomy. Everything is valued in terms of the self, its needs, its fulfillment. Yet, on the other side, the rising rate of intermarriage, poor attendance at prayer, and the general apathy of practice seem to force the admission that if Judaism is to continue in any significant way, it must create a deeper piety and express it in richer observance.

Consider the problem as it arises with teen-agers or college youth, those apostles of individuality. They rebel for more freedom, more independence, the right to be only what they choose to be. Their Jewish teachers know they and their par-

ents are not good enough Jews. The young want greater autonomy. The synagogue wants more Judaism and it defensively tends to see in the cry for more freedom not an appropriate affirmation of human responsibility but a threat to everything it holds dear. For insofar as choice is fully free, it may settle on anything as well as Judaism, and there is enough historic as well as contemporary experience to show that the fear is realistic. Moreover, it would be fantasy to assume that some new philosophic or social scientific answer will quickly solve the problem. Religion is as social and psychological a phenomenon as an intellectual one. Hence the response it gives must be as institutional as it is philosophic, if not more so. For anyone who wants continuing commitment to Judaism, how can the pursuit of autonomy and not Jewish discipline be the ultimate good?

That is the reactionary wing of liberal Judaism speaking, and one hears in its words the instinctive adult response to youthful demands for autonomy: Lay down the law and require its observance. Often this keeps the children in line—for a while. Is that then what progressive Judaism should do? Stem the rising tide of indifference and unconcern by defining necessary beliefs and setting forth required standards of practice?

Were this position only negatively motivated it would have little appeal. Its power stems from the reality of the failure to help liberal Jews understand Jewish belief or instruct them in the value of Jewish observance. How can one expect to win their autonomous assent to Judaism in a world that fights religion and considers Jewish faith odd if they are not given sophisticated, thoughtful guidance as to their living Jewish alternatives in thought and practice? Where are the books on belief and observance serious enough to be considered worthy of review by others than colleagues who owe the author attention?

There is, however, a critical distance between guidance and

authority, between education and legislation. Liberal Judaism was created over precisely this issue, and despite the risks it is difficult to see how it could remain true to itself if it took a dogmatic tack. Where is the theory of revelation which today could authorize by God's own will statements of belief or practice? Is there any human authority to which men should surrender their autonomy? Practically, who would listen to this new insistence on discipline? Surely not the youth, the group about whom most of the worrying is done. They know they are or will be as free as they wish in religious matters. They show it in their attitudes today, in their indifference to campus religious activities of every sort tomorrow. The appeal to tradition for its own sake, the insistence upon authority lest the whole thing fall apart, will only strike them as a typical old man's effort to deprive them of their rights so the aged may stay in power. And their parents are far too much part of the secular world to be any more willing to accept authority. The emancipation of the Jews was based on the secular notion of personal freedom of religion. Having joyously accepted its benefits, Judaism cannot now avoid its risks though they grow increasingly great.

So the call comes from the radical pole to admit that Jews are fully part of the modern world and follow wherever that leads. The appeal here is to the unimpeded pursuit of truth, even should it lead far away from the past. One might argue, somewhat homiletically, that this was always the fundamental concern of Judaism. Was not Abraham the first Jew by virtue of smashing his father's idols and thereby boldly breaking from his religion? This is an age of scientific advance, of intellectual acceleration, of technological conquest. How can Jews remain content to speak in terms of old Semitic or rabbinic mythologies?

The arguments are so familiar they run the risk of being rejected because they have become boring. Yet at this extreme too there is much truth. Surely Judaism has known since the

days of the prophets that Jewish survival depends not on old institutions meticulously preserved but on the God of truth served, if need be, by the destruction of his own house. The old intellectual structures of nineteenth-century German idealism which still serve as the staples of modern Jewish liberalism are hardly fit for a world where the great works of Freud and of Einstein are half a century old and Auschwitz and Hiroshima are nearly a quarter of a century gone. There surely needs to be a statement of Jewish faith as adequate to this age as the Neo-Kantian was to pre World War I German liberal Jewry. The problem, of course, is where to find a proper conceptual matrix for such an explication of Judaism.

The older liberalism could believe that the modern secular mind knows a truth worthy of such trust that it should be allowed to determine what is permissible in modern Jewish belief. To reassert such a relatively uncritical dependency on contemporary philosophy or culture after the lessons of the past century and a half of parasitic liberalism seems unfathomably optimistic amidst a secularity whose chief characteristic is realism pressed almost to the point of pessimism. Yet that is what the radicals propose. They keep hoping they can do for this age what the German reformers did a century ago. They reached out into the culture, into general philosophy, and found a means of explaining Judaism in terms of universal truth. That kept Judaism alive then, and only a similar effort can do so today. (How odd to hear such a decidedly Hegelian assertion in the mouths of supposedly post-Hegelians.)

There are two reasons why this will not work again, one intellectual and one social.

When the German reformers sought survival by fusing their Judaism with the *Zeitgeist*, the spirit of the age, they were in an intellectual climate suffused by a Kantian emphasis on the ethical and a Hegelian concern with history. Both were religiously oriented and thus there was available to the early Jewish liberals a secular, rational spirit relatively accommodat-

ing to their Judaism. That is what the radicals would like to find today. But how accommodating are the major philosophic structures of today? None of them—naturalism, existentialism, phenomenology, linguistic analysis—offers hospitality to anything like traditional ethics, much less religion or God. Judaism even in its progressive form would have to change itself radically to adjust to any one of them. The German reformers sounded modern to their contemporaries because everyone except the materialists was some kind of idealist then. There was a *Zeitgeist* and they could use it. Today the sacrifices of such reinterpretation would produce little return. There is no detectable, pervasive, single *Zeitgeist*. None of the philosophic styles is or shows signs of becoming dominant. Worse, they partially contradict one another. To select one as the new Jewish language means alienating the adherents of the other positions. One cannot hope to convince most modern men in an age of such philosophic pluralism. One can only choose which minority of intellectuals one wishes to address.

That being so, it will not do to see the purpose of progressive Jewish theology as essentially the elucidation of a proper modern concept of God. That might be the goal set by a Neo-Kantian theology in which ideas are all important and the idea of God plays a central role. In a contemporary world of contrary conceptual systems it is fantasy to hope to create one idea so compelling it will unify most Jews in Jewish belief. It is even more incredible, after the German experience, to believe that knowing such an idea will bring people to live by it, much less bring them to Jewish observance or the love of the people of Israel. The hope that adopting one philosophic style or another will save Judaism is so reductive of the complexities of the situation that it must be considered some sort of rationalist wishful thinking, a delightful contradiction in terms indeed.

These methodological considerations might be extended by asking by what criteria one selects the philosophy that will

become the judge of what remains true in Jewish faith. Having dealt with that topic in the previous chapter, I will pass on to the social realities that stand against the radical position.

Modern men, men in every age, do not live by philosophy or hold back on life's major decisions until they have achieved full intellectual clarity concerning them. Most want a rational component in their life-style and moderns seek to amplify it. Our time is often termed postmodern because we have come to realize how little intellect can rule persons, how much we are the creatures of our will and our times. On the surface the German Jewish effort to move with the *Zeltgeist* seemed a straightforward intellectual decision in the Hegelian spirit. Yet it had a most significant social foundation. The early reformers must have sensed that in large part they could depend on their society to encourage ethical religion while setting limits for Jewish assimilation. Accommodation to the culture in their world implied a morally oriented concern with spirit, while negatively its anti-Semitism would keep most Jews within their ancestral community. Besides, their Jews came from an observant community and were surrounded by the historic evidences of their folk past. Many were learned. All had Jewish memories. Their community being deeply Jewish, the thinkers could concentrate on the lessons of autonomy. Their primary thrust is rightly called a Jewish universalism.

That is far from the contemporary Jewish situation. As the secularity of the American society grows, it fortunately has less and less place for overt anti-Semitism and more and more appreciation for Jewish productiveness and creativity. Yet it also has little place for real religion or substantial ethnicity. The rise of democracy and technology means greater freedom for Jews as individuals but less use for them or anyone as a religious community. Indeed, what Judaism must recognize is that contemporary culture is moving toward an amoral, pleasure-seeking, present-oriented human style. One cannot count on educated people to be religious, or spiritual, or even moral

when a real crisis occurs. Modern secular society has no institution, no philosophy or even cultural thrust with which to divert or control its inherent drive toward use and payoff. That, not philosophic inadequacy, is the real challenge confronting Judaism. Moreover, one can no longer count on anti-Semitism or sentiment to keep Jews Jewish. Increasingly, American Jews have few rich memories of Jewishness to fall back on as a last, lowest level of Jewish identity. So it is folly for contemporary Jewish thinkers to elaborate a new Jewish universalism in the unconscious hope that social forces may be counted on to keep men ethical, religious, or Jewish, and thereby counteract their centrifugal thrust. Today such a major outward thrust implies what one could hope it did not in nineteenth-century Germany, committing most of the Jewish community to the new American paganism.

For most liberal Jews, I believe, that is too radical a stance. On the minimal level that is because they believe in the lasting significance of what may for the moment be too simply described as ethics. They may consider freedom a great value, but if it leads to moral nihilism, it has vitiated its own virtue. Freedom is not an end in itself, no matter where it leads, as Sartre and other atheist existentialists argue. For most Jews—even those of little faith—autonomy is precious as the precondition of a mature morality. It is itself an ethical commandment; hence, when it is used to destroy ethics, it negates itself.

To hold such a high view of ethical standards in contemporary society is already to share a minority faith. It is no longer widespread in the contemporary civilization and surely not self-evident or rationally demonstrable. Where one is to find the foundation for it in the future becomes increasingly problematic. So when the children of a community that made law precious and the doing of commandment supreme speak against the crowd for freedom confirmed in ethical responsibility, that may properly be understood as the old Jewish faith expressing itself in modern though truncated form.

Others are more positively Jewish. Having given themselves wholeheartedly to contemporary civilization, particularly its high culture and its politics, and having done so to the point of forgetting or forsaking their Judaism, they find themselves betrayed. With all its greatness, with all its promise, there is a stinking rot near the core of Western, industrial, democratic society. The moral revulsion that Jews felt at the Hitlerian destruction of European Jewry could by the nasty be ascribed to Jewish ghetto sensitivity on the one side and German totalitarian madness on the other. Yet the appalling record of the succeeding decades has made it seem more prophetic than exceptional. Wherever one turns—black men, yellow men; the aged, the poor; the military, the industrialists; the educated, the respected—there is violence and exploitation, madness pretending to respectability, infirmity masquerading as competence.

If that is what a good part of today's world is like, then many men will healthfully want to dissociate from it. The Jewish activism remains too strong for adults to drop out with the flower children or by way of drugs. But to identify completely is likely to mean surrendering values that now suddenly are as dear as they are nonconforming. The cultivation of a proper alienation has become a human necessity. So Jewish roots become a needed source of strength and Jewish forms of expression a helpful way of reaffirming self by taking one's distance from the majority. Having a Jewishness to assert against a freedom gone wild has suddenly become a precious privilege as even the novelists have now discovered.

These realities reestablish the classic paradox of liberal Jewish theology. Only now, so to speak, there must be a change in its social orientation. Jewish universalism has had its day. It has shown, and indispensably so, that Jews can be modern. Now it is time to move to the next task. What is required is a stress on Judaism strong enough to serve as an antidote for paganism and an appreciation of man powerful

enough to make him recognize how much of his fulfillment depends upon himself. That sense of partnership between man and God was basic to the traditional Jewish belief in the Covenant. Yet it strikes a progressive, liberal note in giving man a greater share in its working out—and if God's absence in the Hitler days taught Judaism nothing, it should have taught Jews they must do just that. What is needed today in liberal Judaism, then, is what I propose to call an open traditionalism.

It cannot be a simple reiteration of classic Jewish faith, for what has been learned from a century and a half of progressive Judaism cannot be denied. Traditional Jews had once become so dependent upon God and his saving power that they seemed to have forgotten how to help themselves. They were abjectly passive before social injustice and historical abuse. They could only go to Palestine to die, not to rebuild themselves or the Jewish people. The Reform movement came into being in reaction to that denigration of man. Its history has legitimated, in a way that cannot be gainsaid, the modern Jew's fundamental concern for autonomy. So this reasserted traditionalism must be open, recognizing the basic importance of the free choice of human action, including, therefore, the right to conscientious dissent from what Jewish tradition once required or strongly urged.

Such openness led the early reformers to place all their trust in man and his creativity. They were self-confident and optimistic about society. It was enough for God to be an integrating moral idea. History was man's province. In the light of later events their faith seems childish and naïve, an overcompensation against traditional belief as understandable for them as it is unacceptable today. Jewish humanism with religious trimmings and certainly more radical forms of openness will not do at this moment of crisis in civilization. So the openness affirmed here is first directed inward toward Jewish belief and practice. Historic Judaism is claimed as the ground of one's

personal existence, yet in that act the right to dissent is carried along. If the differences with the tradition which arise become fundamental, they might shatter the essential paradoxicality of the stand and a radical individualism would have to be reasserted. Or one might discover there was a principle of dissent which represented the highest truth to which one's autonomy was pledged. Liberals would have great respect for either of those outcomes though they might lead the searching soul out of Judaism. For the reasons given above, it can be hoped that this will not become the common case for those reestablishing their Jewish faith. It should also be noted that there is another possibility which might occur. It might turn out that the individual discovers he has no reason to dissent from the tradition whatsoever and is, in fact, orthodox. Liberals should see in such an autonomously reclaimed orthodoxy a surprising but a happy Jewish result indeed.

This emphasis on tradition, though open, makes it possible to believe that for the first time in liberal Jewish history a reverse relation to the culture may become possible, that Jewish faith may now be legitimated as its possible critic. Ever since the emancipation, the judgment has come steadily from the outside. It was enough to make one wonder whether there was anything in Jewish faith that could stand up against a widely held modern belief. Now Judaism becomes precious for just that which once made it undesirable, its quality of alienation and transcendence of the society.

This has direct application to the problem of relating Judaism and philosophy. In this new approach to Jewish thought it is the tradition, openly held, which is the most important criterion of the philosophy used to interpret it. Which of the modern options is most congenial to its content, not which is most widely held or persuasively represented on campus this decade, determines the mode of doing theology in an open traditionalism. In terms of my Jewish affirmations, religious existentialism is the most complementary philosophic style

available. It supplies the hermeneutic instrument for interpreting Judaism in modern terms but may not usurp that role as a means to replace the primacy of traditional Jewish faith for me. That is what this self-conscious commitment to open traditionalism clarifies. Now when the religious existentialist insights contradict what study shows is classic Jewish faith, as is true in the areas of society, history, and law, I do not automatically judge Judaism to be wrong. Rather, I investigate to see what it is that I truly affirm. Perhaps I believe as the existentialists do and thereby discover a principle to my dissent and thus a higher faith which I affirm. Perhaps here I do autonomously uphold traditional belief and am thus led to criticize and correct religious existentialism. In the case of society and history it seems to me the existentialists are wrong and need the interpersonal, time-oriented vision which Jewish faith provides. In the case of law I dissent from both positions. That leads me to a Jewish sense that all authentic existence must be structured, an understanding foreign to existentialism. Yet I am also moved to an existentialist reworking of Jewish law in personalist terms it could not traditionally tolerate.

It is also important to keep in mind that this approach is not normally static. Openness implies new ideas, new insight, new consideration, the ongoing process of again and again winning one's traditionalism by personal affirmation. There is no guarantee that what is cherished today will not be discarded tomorrow. That is the risk of freedom without which mature humanity is unobtainable.

An open traditionalism would necessarily shake itself into incompatible pieces if it tried to come into being primarily as either a body of coherent doctrine, as the radicals generally prescribe, or as a body of required practice, as the reactionaries insist. The former is too abstract to tolerate paradox; the latter, too specific to tolerate freedom. What is needed rather is something far more existential, what may be termed style. Without sophistication one has behavior but not style. Without

structure one is only erratic. In recognizable style, mind and action interpenetrate, integrating in life what if left to mind alone would be paradox. The present stage of Jewish theology should work toward the creation and definition of this modern style of Jewish being. One way of doing so is to show through analysis that the fundamental dialectic of such a style is not a matter of arbitrary decision but a necessary relatedness in the two basic faiths.

The key to such a demonstration comes from the recognition that any life lived in devotion to autonomy must, despite a cool exterior or a therapeutic humor, at some point reach a sense of high seriousness. Playing superautonomy demands dedication to survive. A casual concern with it in this culture means its speedy demise, a self-contradiction not to be resolved. Modern Judaism, however, can be hospitable to the autonomous approach because it knows that when man faces himself in ultimate seriousness he stands ready to transcend himself. Man cannot serve as the ground of his own dignity. He is not self-explanatory or self-justifying. The question Who is man? leads on, if it is radically affirmative, to Who is God? Anthropology in depth is the contemporary way to theology.

Seriousness means that at some point in seeking to be true to oneself one turns back upon one's assumptions with enough power to ask radical questions about them. What is the faith implicit in the passion for autonomy? What commitments ground the right of the person to take himself and to be taken by others with such seriousness? Those become the critical questions on the way to reconciling the paradox.

The individual may claim that his concern for his autonomy was simply his own idea, that it is a self-validating, willed value. Yet if it is important to make a similar assertion for all men, if such a universal sense of autonomy should be one of the most fundamental considerations in organizing society, then it will not do to rest such comprehensive weight on so arbitrary a basis. For one may well ask in all seriousness today

as one would have hesitated to do in more liberalistic times. Why should anyone affirm himself? Most people know themselves to be in many respects deeply unworthy of high regard. That is not a neurotic symptom. After all one's childish fantasies have been brought to consciousness and made to face reality, one may still wonder at one's worth. Even the mature continually fail to meet their own standards or the reasonable demands of those they love. Self-acceptance is one of the great moral and psychic commandments of this era—precisely because it is so difficult if men are expected to be realistic about themselves and what they ought to be.

The imperative to be autonomous cannot be grounded in oneself and surely not in a culture that regularly tramples on it. Nor does the faith of every religion lead to it. Confucius would have men bend the self to the old social values. Lao-tzu asks that the self empty itself so the way of nature may become its way. Hinduism would lose the soul in the World Soul. Buddhism does not consider the self a reality to be enhanced and strengthened. Only in Judaism and its daughter religions does autonomy become possible, indeed necessary.

The Hebrews know man as the single creature who is formed in God's image and bound to God as Covenant partner. Not even his sins break that relationship as his punishment by God under the Covenant shows. That is how radically the worth of his existence is asserted. Yet the Covenant relationship does not require man to surrender himself or to escape from self. Rather, he must affirm his selfhood to participate in it, for it is made with him quite specifically as man. He is not asked to be an angel to fulfill his part in it. Its commandments call him to be only what a man can be. In the rabbinic understanding, man is not only the focus of the commandments but the master of their elaboration against all miracles or other supposed divine intervention. Under such a covenant, man can in rare instances stand on his rights as partner and question even God. His more normal role is to accept God's sovereignty

and live by God's law. That he always remains free to accept or reject. Even against God, man has a certain autonomy.

That traditional understanding is not the same as modern man's sense of autonomy, since there the superior status of the Divine and the specificity of his revealed will tend to keep man's freedom to respond at a minimum. Still it is the root whence, by way of Greek abstraction and modern rationalist universalization, it grew to the affirmation of each man's moral dignity. Jewish faith still knows such a God and such a relationship of acceptance and obligation with man. That is the theological root of its contemporary moral disgust. Moreover, Judaism has had extraordinary experience in translating this faith into a daily way of life. It has had such success that Jewish patterns still substantially survive in the general human concerns of Jewish lives despite widespread disbelief and nonobservance. So the Jewish child receives that special welcome and concern which befits a new manifestation of the divine image. Each Jew is pressured to study or to earn because great value is attached to his working out his unique capacities. The family and the community form the social matrix which keeps this attitude toward persons alive and functioning. Intense folk bonds keep the people an identifiable community linked to its ancient traditions though history has been cruel and perfidious. With all its fostering of commonalities, this is a people of fierce individualists, a folk who glory in argument and abhor hierarchy. If autonomy is precious in an antipersonal society, then being Jewish gives one the kind of faith, the sort of life, the community support, the historic experience which makes it possible even today. It is not clear where else in the modern world, except in Christianity, one might otherwise find adequate substantiation for man's vigorous affirmation of his autonomy.

So the paradox of living by autonomy and tradition simultaneously may now be resolved. That does not take the form of subordinating one of the affirmations to the other as both the

radicals and reactionaries desire but rather by showing that neither can claim priority over the other. Each depends on its polar opposite. Jewish faith increasingly cannot be the passive continuation of a social heritage which is what it essentially was in previous Jewish generations. The more modern one is, the more one insists that it is a matter of responsible willing. One should choose to be Jewish and resist as nondeterminative the claims of family, history, or personal sentiment. That choice, particularly since it is a fundamental commitment of one's life, must be made autonomously to be authentic. Yet the high value attached to autonomy is no longer self-explanatory. One can explain one's seriousness about it and one's determined pursuit of it only in terms of a prior faith: for the Jew, Judaism. The tradition grounds the autonomy—but it must be the basis of affirming the tradition—and so endlessly. The circle of faith is complete and in its harmonious closing the integrity of liberal Jewish existence despite its paradoxical foundation is established.